



STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE

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INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you to discuss the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It has been my great honor to serve as Commander in Chief of USEUCOM (USCINCEUR) for nearly three years. Throughout my tenure, the men and women of our Armed Forces have performed superbly. They have met every challenge, fulfilled every operational commitment, and have proven time and again they are our most important resource.

USEUCOM's challenges continue. USEUCOM is involved in shaping the international environment through our engagement programs. We are responding through contingency operations across the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). We also face challenges of preparing our forces for the future, including transitioning to lighter, more flexible forces better able to execute the National Security Strategy.

We continue to require forward-deployed and forward-based forces to protect U.S. national interests, and recognize that the demands on these forces are high and impacting our overall readiness and modernization posture.

Through engagement, we increase stability and keep the threat of conflict at the lowest level possible. By engaging during peacetime, we shape the security environment, develop coalition partners, help prevent crises from occurring, and deter violence and armed conflict.

Our **USEUCOM Vision Statement** explains our strategy of engagement:

USEUCOM shapes the international environment by strengthening the factors that promote stability, preventing or reducing conflicts or threats, and conducting deterrence operations in peacetime. These peacetime activities aim to prevent armed conflict and reduce the conditions that lead to it; they also create conditions that contribute greatly to our ability to respond.

USCINCEUR Vision Statement

To help shape the international environment, USEUCOM is executing a strategy of regional engagement in order to prevent conflict and promote US interests. As we demonstrated in the Kosovo conflict, in the event that we are unable to prevent conflict, we must be ready to respond quickly with appropriate force to deal with any crisis or to defeat any aggressor.

Today I would like to discuss the current situation in Bosnia and Kosovo, OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, other strategic challenges, training and readiness, and other key issues addressed in the FY2001 Defense Authorization and Appropriations bills.

BOSNIA AND OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Kosovo

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is working to set the conditions for peace and security within Kosovo. The force operates under the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) concluded between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The KFOR mission includes deterring renewed hostilities,

establishing and maintaining a secure environment, assisting internally displaced persons and returning refugees within its means and capabilities, as well as implementing the details of the MTA.

Much has been achieved in the eight months since the suspension of the air campaign on 10 June. The evolution from combat to peace implementation occurred almost overnight, and by 12 June the first KFOR elements were on the ground. Presently, there are 31 maneuver battalions in KFOR comprised of nearly 37,500 Allied troops, including over 5,300 Americans. For comparison purposes, Italy and Germany each provide over 5,500 troops to the operation, and a German officer currently commands KFOR. Additionally, seventeen non-NATO nations contribute over 7,500 troops. Overall, our Allies provide approximately 85 percent of the troops for this operation.

U.S. Forces lead the effort in the Southeast sector of Kosovo as part of the Multinational Brigade East. Our forces face a difficult environment on a daily basis. During the first six months, in the vicinity of the U.S. troops in KFOR, there were 615 incidents of hostile fire, 15 mortar or recoilless rifle attacks, 20 altercations with unruly crowds, 129 grenade attacks, and 58 mine strikes. While the vast majority of attacks were not directed against KFOR troops, they create a dangerous environment in which to work.

In addition, there are 616 minefields with 35,814 mines laid by Yugoslav Military Forces and 136 minefields laid by unknown sources with an undetermined number of mines. As of last month, KFOR had destroyed 1,500 mines and over 5,600 items of unexploded ordnance. We have lost one soldier as a result of a land mine, and had two wounded (minor injuries) in the U.S. sector as a result of hostile action. In a typical week, soldiers of the Multinational Brigade East conduct 1,321 security patrols (day and night), and provide seven day a week, twenty-four hour a day, security at 48 checkpoints and 62 key facilities. Our troops are extremely busy and are doing a superb job.

The military implementation has proceeded relatively smoothly. Serb forces completed their withdrawal in accordance with the MTA. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has demilitarized and has been transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The mission of the KPC is to perform humanitarian missions to include disaster relief operations. Training requirements for the KPC are still being developed and KFOR will provide assistance, advice, and direction for KPC training.

Despite our progress in missions assigned to the military, civil implementation has been slow and in Kosovo today, civil government structures are lacking. Criminal activities and violence remain constant challenges. The province has inadequate infrastructure and a precarious economy. This reality requires extensive and quick work in four areas: civil implementation, the rule of law, infrastructure improvements, and contingency funding.

Civil Implementation. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 authorizes the UN Secretary General, with the assistance of other international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is providing a transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo. Although UNMIK started slowly, it is making progress towards civil implementation and normalizing Kosovo.

The work of UNMIK is being conducted in five integrated phases. The first phase is focusing on the establishment and consolidation of UNMIK's authority and the creation of interim UNMIK-managed administrative structures. The second phase is directed toward the administration of social services, utilities, and the consolidation of the rule of law. The third phase

will be the conduct of elections. The fourth phase, if necessary, is assist elected Kosovo representatives in their efforts to organize and establish provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government. The final phase includes the transfer of authority from provisional institutions to those established under a final political settlement, and the eventual termination of UNMIK presence in Kosovo.

While UNMIK has overall responsibility for civil implementation in Kosovo, other organizations are making significant contributions. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is responsible for institution building and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) Training School. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) manages the humanitarian effort, and the European Union (EU) manages all economic and infrastructure reconstruction efforts.

The pace of contributions to the manning and resources of UNMIK have resulted in sporadic and uneven progress toward civil implementation goals. Many of the nations and organizations providing aid to Kosovo are also assisting other countries around the world. Resources are limited and donors will need to carefully balance their contributions among competing requirements.

Rule of Law. There is an urgent need to build a genuine rule of law in Kosovo, including the re-establishment of an independent, impartial, multi-ethnic judiciary. The UNMIK Judicial Affairs Office is currently providing judicial oversight and has four major areas of responsibility. These are: the administration of courts, prosecution services, and prisons; the development of legal policy; review and drafting of legislation; and the assessment of justice in Kosovo. Several hundred local judges and prosecutors have been appointed and sworn-in. Although ethnic Albanians fill the majority of these positions, there are Serb representatives in both areas.

Crime remains a significant problem in Kosovo. Crime rates have dropped by approximately 83 percent over the last six months. The murder rate has declined from a peak of 127 reported murders per 100,000 population per annum to a rate of 23. Arson and kidnapping have also dramatically declined. This is due in no small measure to KFOR efforts.

KFOR elements and the international police force strive to provide a secure environment, but they cannot be everywhere at once. Most nations do not maintain ready forces of deployable civil or para-military police, exactly what is required in Kosovo-like contingencies. There is a stated requirement for 4,718 police for Kosovo, and this is our goal. Unfortunately there are less than 2,000 currently deployed.

The OSCE has established the KPS Training School in *Vucitrn* to train new officers. The first class recently graduated 176 students all of whom are involved in follow-on field training. The second class with 178 students will graduate this month; however, it will be sometime before the KPS is ready to assume control of law enforcement duties in Kosovo.

Infrastructure Needs. Hard work and generous contributions by many organizations and nations prevented a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. Despite the vast destruction of homes and infrastructure by Serb forces throughout Kosovo, most Kosovars have access to shelter during this winter season. This was no small feat considering the huge number of refugees and displaced persons who returned to find their homes looted, burned and destroyed. Overall food supplies and distribution are relatively good. Electric generating capacity, consisting of two electric plants, is being restored to meet the needs of the Kosovar population. Greece is assisting with electrical power supplies, and other Allies are providing petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

The province is serviced from the south by a single rail line operated with a few older locomotives donated by European nations. A single two-lane road from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provides vehicle access. We are working to improve this infrastructure, as

this route has four critical bridges with structural integrity that is unknown and questionable. The route also includes two significant tunnels that, if blocked, would bring supply operations to a halt. Failure of this supply line would have severe consequences for the population and our forces deployed in KFOR.

The near-term economic outlook for Kosovo is precarious. The industrial and manufacturing sector is debilitated due to lack of capital investment, damage caused during the conflict, and in some cases, by the departure of Serb managers and skilled workers. Significant economic activity will continue to be hampered by the existing system of discriminatory property rights, inadequate infrastructure, and lack of commercial and industrial financing.

The international community is providing the citizens of Kosovo with essential life preserving humanitarian support. This effort has been a tremendous success when measured against the time constraints imposed by the onset of winter, and the sheer numbers of Kosovars needing assistance. Civil-Military Relations. We continue to enjoy the support of the people of Kosovo in executing our mission. The recent events in the town of *Vitina*, involving allegations of improper action by U.S. service members, are under investigation. The overwhelming majority of our nearly 5,300 troops continue to do an outstanding job under adverse circumstances and deserve our strong support.

Bosnia

Progress with the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)-the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)--was affected for several months due to the situation in Kosovo, and there remain issues requiring action by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), and the numerous civil implementation organizations. Coordination between the Office of the High Representative, SFOR, and other international organizations is good and we are looking at significant troop reductions this spring. There have also been a number of other successes over this past year.

Brcko Arbitration. The mediation was successfully completed in March of 1999, with agreement between the Republic Srpska (RS) and the Federation concluded on December 31, 1999. As agreed with SFOR and the Office of the High Representative, RS forces were allowed a limited extension to remove their personnel from the demilitarized area, and are on track to be out by the end of February. Completion of this process will be a significant achievement in the *Brcko* process. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. This is the primary focus and key issue from which all other progress should be measured. Returns today are well above 1998 levels, with almost 70,000 persons returned during 1999. Considerable progress can still be made in this area. Police presence is vital to this task, as well as effective enforcement of housing regulations to restore properties to former residents. SFOR will support, within its mandate and capabilities, but cannot and should not be responsible for police functions.

Media Reforms. The Bosnian media has made progress toward open and unbiased reporting in all formats, but SFOR is still needed to guard against unauthorized and ethnic-based broadcasters.

War Crimes and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). During 1999, the arrest of two prominent Bosnian Serb army generals highlighted the continued efforts of the ICTY. The ICTY continues to work for justice in an area that remains both difficult and sensitive given the many legal, operational and political complexities of its mandate. SFOR support remains critical for success in this endeavor.

Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime and Corruption. This is a key impediment to setting a positive environment for economic growth and DPPE returns. Our challenge is to eliminate illegal and parallel institutions and to remove corrupt leaders who cooperate with criminal elements.

Force Reductions. DPA implementation is now assessed semi-annually, with these reviews providing the means of measuring progress toward a sustainable peace. They also form the basis for establishing a meaningful exit strategy, and serve as a forum for examining SFOR troop strength and proposing force reductions. In the case of SFOR VII rotation the latest examination indicates a reduction in SFOR troop strength from 31,000 to 20,000. The U.S. reduction is from 6,100 troops to 3,900 (plus 750 theater "enablers") in April.

Operation ALLIED FORCE

I am grateful for the support the members of this committee provided throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE. Many of you visited our troops during the operation and witnessed operations first-hand. We could not have succeeded in this difficult endeavor without your strong support. NATO Goals. This was a victory for the United States and for NATO. NATO has emerged from this conflict a stronger and more viable Alliance as it enters the 21st Century. The enduring achievement of the Alliance during this first NATO offensive operation was maintaining unity and resolve throughout the 78-day air campaign.

Our diplomatic conditions for the termination of the air campaign were clearly articulated by Alliance leaders:

- A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forces;
- Stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
- Unconditional and safe return of all refugees and internally displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and
- Establishment of a political framework for Kosovo, on the basis of the *Rambouillet* Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Our mission was to degrade and disrupt the Yugoslavian campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. It required that we adapt our military doctrine and strategy to strike a balance between maintaining Alliance cohesion, striking elements of the Yugoslav Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure, minimizing losses of Alliance aircraft, and preventing collateral damage.

The Air Campaign. Planning for Operation ALLIED FORCE included four operational phases, and a redeployment phase. NATO launched the campaign on 24 March 99 against Slobodan Milosevic's regime of repression. We commenced operations with 366 aircraft executing 40 missions the first night. Seventy-eight days later, NATO had assembled a force of more than 900 aircraft, two-thirds of which were American. During the air campaign NATO forces flew over 38,000 sorties, including over 14,000 strike sorties, with only two aircraft (F-117 and F-16) and no crewmembers lost to hostile action. We delivered over 23,000 weapons of various types during the conflict. The accuracy of our strikes and minimal collateral damage set new standards for a military operation of this size, scope, and duration. Despite the best efforts of Serb propaganda, most understood very well that NATO did everything possible—everything within its power—to focus on the enemy and keep harm away from innocent civilians. This was in stark contrast to Serbian Army and paramilitary forces, which were deliberately and systematically conducting a well-planned and brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against civilians implemented as a matter of state policy.

The success of Operation ALLIED FORCE is a testament to the political unity and courage of NATO members in the face of adversity. Fourteen of 19 Alliance nations contributed forces, including 305 aircraft. These aircraft flew over 15,000 sorties. In addition, NATO nations provided basing and other logistical support required for Alliance aircraft to execute this operation. In the end, Alliance cohesion not only held, but was stronger and more determined.

Humanitarian Assistance. In addition to the military campaign, NATO was simultaneously involved in a humanitarian assistance operation of epic proportions. Operation SHINING HOPE helped to prevent mass starvation among the 850,000 Kosovar refugees fleeing for their lives to Macedonia and Albania.

We received indications early in the air campaign that Yugoslavia had planned an operation for the rapid depopulation of Kosovo of its resident ethnic Albanians. Apparently, this operation had as one of its objectives the destabilization of the countries adjacent to Kosovo. Coupled with a massive disinformation campaign designed to show refugees fleeing from NATO air strikes, this operation also worked towards halting NATO's air campaign through international condemnation.

In response, allied aircraft flew over 500 airlift sorties, delivering 4.5 million tons of food, 1,962 tons of shelter, and 57 tons of medical supplies. Refugee camps were constructed on a rapid basis. In Macedonia alone, the *Brazda-Stenkovac* camps were constructed in less than a week by Allied and partner forces.

Lessons Learned. The first and foremost lesson learned from Operation ALLIED FORCE is that we succeeded. NATO worked. Common procedures and training over fifty years resulted in an alliance able to overcome numerous challenges and exert the military and diplomatic pressure necessary to force President Milosevic to capitulate. The political leadership of the entire NATO Alliance deserves credit for the ultimate success of this operation.

As the campaign progressed, we broadened and intensified the campaign, numbers of aircraft were tripled, strikes were extended to additional sets of targets, and we kept up pressure against Serb forces on the ground. As commanders, we had to press continuously to conduct the campaign with the greatest possible use of air power. Our efforts to do so, however, had to be balanced with the need to maintain Alliance cohesion and unity. The loss of consensus would have ended the campaign. Sustaining unity in the face of efforts to destabilize the countries around Yugoslavia, a sustained propaganda campaign, ethnic cleansing, and the efforts of certain nations to halt our actions, sent a powerful message to the international community in general, and to Slobodan Milosevic in particular. This message was that NATO stood together, we could win, and we would win.

Two key lessons emerge in terms of capability. First, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources, both equipment and personnel, are essential to every aspect of modern warfare. Areas impacted by ISR include force protection, targeting, and bomb damage assessment. Air-to-ground surveillance systems, such as JSTARS, are a requirement to attack fielded forces from the air. Second, there is a requirement for additional resources for other low density, high demand mission areas. These include electronic warfare, civil affairs, linguists, and intelligence analysts. We presently do not have enough of these assets to meet our needs.

Additionally, we should strongly support funding for our intelligence agencies, particularly in support of infrastructure requirements of the National Security Agency.

During the early days of the campaign, we saw the impact of adverse weather on air operations. Many strike sorties had to be canceled or targets changed due to cloud cover in the target area. We should improve our capabilities in this area to prevent potential adversaries from gaining sanctuary during periods of poor weather.

Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) proved very effective and demonstrated immense potential by allowing highly accurate strikes while minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties. Of particular note was the success of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). This low cost, highly accurate weapon provided the capability to strike during adverse weather conditions. We also launched over 300 cruise missiles from aircraft, ships, and submarines to great effect. The Sixth Fleet demonstrated the flexibility of Tomahawk missiles, as they responded in rapid fashion with a quick-strike on a pop-up target.

This operation also revalidated the importance of mobility assets in general, and air refueling and strategic airlift assets in particular. During this operation 1,751 airlift missions moved 78,000 tons of supplies and 42,380 passengers. The C-17 proved very effective in moving both military and humanitarian supplies from the Continental United States (CONUS) and within theater. Tankers were critical in providing air refueling for the initial force deployment, for strategic airlift from the CONUS, and for aircraft supporting and conducting strike operations.

Task Force Hawk. Over 5,000 troops deployed to *Tirana*, Albania. Considering the size of the group, the infrastructure limitations, the arduous conditions at the airfield, and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the soldiers of Task Force Hawk did a magnificent job. On arrival, they built an operating base, strengthened their operational procedures and prepared to engage the enemy. While it is true the Apaches did not engage in direct combat, their presence stiffened the resolve of the Albanian people and gave their government courage to put their armed forces up to the border. The presence of Task Force Hawk changed the strategic balance in the region and provided a credible ground threat. It contributed directly to the victory of the air campaign. The men and women deployed as part of Task Force Hawk deserve tremendous credit for accomplishing a very difficult mission in an extremely harsh environment. One key lesson learned is that we must continue to improve our ability to detect, locate, and attack fielded forces on the ground in a rapid fashion.

Defense Capabilities Initiative. Finally, Operation ALLIED FORCE illuminated the capability gaps between the U.S. military and our NATO Allies. For example, not all NATO nations possess adequate precision munitions, secure communications, and mobility assets in terms of airlift and tankers. These gaps impeded interoperability among allied forces during the campaign. NATO is working to address this issue through the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) approved at the NATO Summit earlier this year. Ultimately, NATO nations need to be willing to spend the money and make the tough decisions necessary to upgrade their militaries to ensure they remain compatible with U.S. forces.

NATO AND REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

NATO'S NEW MEMBERS

Last year Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined the NATO Alliance immediately prior to the start of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Developments in all three countries are positive.

In the continued effort to integrate new members into the Alliance, I have two sets of responsibilities. As NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I must address the military requirements of enlargement. As USCINCEUR, I must ensure USEUCOM does our part in providing U.S. military support and assistance to the new members.

The key element for each of these new NATO nations is to carry out the commitments made prior to accession to increase their defense budgets so that they meet the agreed minimum military requirements. This process is well underway, and we are monitoring progress and assisting where needed.

All nations are also making progress in the development of staff procedures and processes to integrate effectively into the NATO force structure and system. For example, the First Armored Division set up the first exercise in Europe for Hungarian forces to practice in an Article V combat environment. Exercise IRON DRAGON, conducted in mid-December 1999 with the 25th Hungarian Brigade, was the seminal work integrating these new militaries into the NATO system.

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

In the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, it is clear that Europeans wish to assume a new responsibility for European regional stability that is independent of the United States. This will require the Europeans to do more to help NATO remain poised for collective defense, while they assume greater responsibility for supporting security operations.

We should encourage an ESDI that promotes greater defense capabilities and investment so European nations may conduct these operations without total reliance on the United States.

At the same time, development of ESDI is not without some risk, as we must not create parallel structures that exclude the non-European allies. In the view of a majority of European nations, SHAPE will have a crucial role in guarding against this risk and is uniquely positioned to consolidate military resources and coordinate these operations.

Successfully addressing the ESDI initiative will take time, but it will not happen unless the United States is a willing partner and contributes in a positive manner.

Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Relations

Relations between Greece and Turkey have been marked by significant positive developments. Reciprocal visits by Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou and Turkish Foreign Minister Cem have raised the profile and credibility of an increasingly substantive dialogue. Contacts between the two militaries have contributed significantly, as did the generous responses of the two countries to relief efforts when earthquakes devastated the region. The capture of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan and the exposure of Greek involvement in his evasion added to tensions but led to serious discussions to address the terrorism threat.

Although tensions persist in divided Cyprus, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders have engaged in a new round of UN-sponsored talks to develop confidence-building measures. Progress toward a settlement has been encouraged by Cypriot economic interests in obtaining EU membership, and by improvements in relations between Greece and Turkey. Following severe earthquakes in the two countries last year, each government rushed emergency response teams and relief assistance to help the other. The reciprocal assistance in response to natural disasters led to marked warming of public attitudes, which in turn facilitated government moves to take cautious steps toward bilateral cooperation.

Most recently, Greek Foreign Minister Papendreau visited Ankara, and Turkish Foreign Minister Cem visited Athens, the first such high-level visits in many years. A number of bilateral

agreements have been signed on economic and social programs, and official channels are supplemented by contacts between the respective business communities. Both governments have moved steadily to implement the new NATO military command structure in NATO's Southern Region, under which there are Turkish officers in Greece and Greek officers assigned in Turkey. Similarly, new procedures for receiving and distributing information about flight operations through NATO air control centers may help overcome longstanding differences over military flights in the Aegean area.

USEUCOM continues close cooperation with the respective military forces of the two countries, including an active program of bilateral and multi-national exercises and training activities.

North Africa

There are three sources of tension in North Africa. The first is the Islamist insurgency in Algeria, where security forces have persuaded moderate rebels to surrender, but are still fighting hardliners. The government of President Bouteflika has made significant strides in undercutting support for the insurgency. However, the behavior of both the military leadership and insurgents will be critical to the progress of political reform efforts and the environment for badly needed foreign investment. Complete restoration of civil order in the countryside may take several years, and social tensions will continue after the conflict. However, there is a general trend toward greater internal stability.

Libya has been a source for concern. Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya continues to pursue the development of WMD and delivery systems, but has had little success. Islamist opposition to Qadhafi has found limited popular support and has met with a strong effective response from Qadhafi's security forces.

Finally, the Western Sahara issue remains unresolved. The new King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, has initiated a series of measures to make Moroccan administration of the territory more humane, but the long-term effects of these policies is still unclear. The UN-sponsored process to hold a referendum on the final status of the territory remains bogged down over disagreement about the voter list, and there has been little progress on other issues as well. On a positive note, the Polisario and Morocco recently agreed to the repatriation of 186 Prisoners of War (POWs) to Morocco. We are encouraging the return of the remaining 1,400 POWs, all of whom have been held for more than 10 years.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa will remain a source of internecine conflict and instability. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC) has aptly been labeled "Africa's First World War." The effort to establish an effective peace process has been given some impetus by the recent proceedings of the Security Council during the January presidency of the United States.

Nonetheless, the prospects for continuing conflict involving the DROC and other countries in the region remains a matter of great concern. The concern stems from the number of military forces that have been involved in the conflict, the large land mass of the DROC and the potential for greater regional instability if the parties do not adhere to the Lusaka agreement. The Administration has notified the Congress of its intent to support Phase two of a UN Observer mission in the DROC to support the Lusaka agreement. In addition, UN peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leona continue to help implement a peace agreement to end a nine-year civil war. There will be continuing and even growing pressures for multilateral peace keeping operations (PKOs) and humanitarian relief

operations (HUMROs), particularly in the Central and West African regions. The presence of large numbers of displaced persons and refugees will demand HUMRO assistance to avoid famine, pestilence, and genocide.

Several states will experience growing regional influence, particularly South Africa and Nigeria. The successful transition of power in Nigeria, including military down-sizing and support for the newly elected and installed civilian government, is important to the entire region.

U.S. military involvement with respect to this part of the world first of all involves the protection of U.S. citizens and interests. In some cases this may require the intervention of U.S. forces to conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). We expect to remain engaged with African militaries to build their capacity to contribute to peace support operations and to work with military and civilian defense personnel to better equip them to address defense and security issues in a democratic context.

Weapons Of Mass Destruction

The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat emanates both from within the USEUCOM AOR in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as outside of it, in Iran and Iraq. Additionally, we face the difficulty posed by new developments in hardened and deeply-buried storage and command and control facilities.

Syria

Syria has a mature chemical weapons capability and is able to deliver chemical agents with missiles and aircraft. It produces chemical agents and is seeking a production capability that would largely be independent of outside suppliers. Damascus possesses adequate biotechnical infrastructure to support biological warfare programs, and may be conducting research related to biological warfare. It is operationally capable of using SCUD B, SCUD C, and SS-21 missiles, and produces SCUD missiles with North Korean help. Syria views Israel as its primary external threat and sees its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as a means to counter Israel's conventional superiority.

Libya

Libya remains a significant proliferation concern. Tripoli has a long-standing goal of acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon, but its efforts have suffered from mismanagement and lack of substantive foreign assistance. Tripoli possesses chemical weapons and showed its willingness to use them in 1987 with an attack on Chadian troops. Libya produced blister and nerve agents in the 1980s at its plant in Rabta, but, when international pressure was brought to bear, it halted production and began construction of an underground chemical agent production facility at Tarhunah. Work there was subsequently suspended. Libya has a biological weapons program, but the country lacks the scientific and technical base to produce agent on a large scale, limiting its program to the Research and Development (R&D) stage. Although Libya's capabilities to use WMD are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states or terrorist groups he supports and that support him.

Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW)

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation NORTHERN WATCH, consisting of U.S., Turkish, and United Kingdom forces, continues to enforce the Northern No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Northern Iraq, and monitor Iraqi compliance with applicable UN Security Council resolutions. U.S. forces in a cooperative effort, with our British and Turkish allies, have flown more than 8,000 missions over Northern Iraq.

Since Operation DESERT FOX in December of 1998, Iraq has mounted increased challenges to enforcement of the Northern NFZ. Iraqi ground forces have attempted to engage coalition aircraft with Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). After our aircraft have been targeted from ground sites, U.S. forces have responded in self-defense with missiles and laser-guided munitions. Our aircraft have targeted and hit the Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS) with outstanding accuracy. We assess that we have struck some 342 targets, all of which were part of the IADS, degrading Iraq's Air Defense Artillery (ADA) capability significantly in the ONW area north of the 36th Parallel.

This combat situation continues today, with air-to-air and air-to-ground combat a constant concern as Iraqi aircraft and air defense forces continue to challenge the NFZ. In recent months, Saddam Hussein has changed his primary strategy away from open defiance of ONW presence, instead making an effort to portray ONW activities as causing collateral damage and human tragedy.

The Turkish Parliament has renewed the semi-annual ONW mandate to continue operations and basing at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. At the request of the Government of Turkey, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), deployed the Patriot missile system to provide Theater Missile Defense (TMD) for Incirlik and neighboring Adana from January until July 1999.

READINESS AND TRAINING

Forward Presence

Forward presence, vital to implementing our strategy, is achieved through a combination of forward-stationed forces, rotational forces, and deployments. These forces must be structured for power projection and should possess the physical and intellectual agility, as well as versatility, to contend with the complex operational challenges of the future. They must be fully prepared to operate in conjunction with Allies and partners across the spectrum of military operations, in any environment, in both peace and conflict.

Forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces in the theater are indispensable to the conduct of USEUCOM missions supporting the National Security Strategy. Forward-deployed forces respond more quickly, being an ocean closer, as demonstrated through numerous deployments in 1999, from Patriot Missile task forces sent to Turkey and Israel and deployments into Kosovo, to a number of other operations in Southwest Asia and Africa.

There are some outstanding operational challenges facing USEUCOM. USEUCOM's permanently stationed forces today number around 100,000 troops, down from over 300,000 during the Cold War. The current force level represents a 65 percent reduction from 1990 and

must be considered the minimum level needed to execute our *National Security Strategy*, meet NATO requirements, conduct engagement programs, and provide a foundation for Continental United States (CONUS) reinforcements.

Rotational Forces

Rotational forces are a vital component of our forward-deployed force. Naval assets make up the majority of USEUCOM's rotational forces. They provide a critical presence in the Mediterranean littoral, where we have few permanently stationed forces. These rotational, strategically mobile forces can be tailored with engagement forces, such as U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments embarked in Navy or U.S. Coast Guard ships. Forward-deployed naval forces can conduct engagement activities and can immediately transition to crisis response.

Furthermore, over the past 15 years, contingencies requiring naval presence have increased three-fold, while naval presence in this theater has been cut by nearly one half. While naval assets in the USEUCOM AOR can be on-station two weeks faster than ships deployed from the East Coast of the United States, our Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) presence levels in the USEUCOM AOR have been below what we consider adequate to deter conflict and support ongoing operations. We anticipate that this year, like last year, we will have neither a CVBG nor an ARG available to USEUCOM for a period of time. Additional strains on USEUCOM capabilities are felt as the munitions inventories on ships deployed to this AOR have been reduced to support other operations.

Similarly, United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) provides both forward-stationed and deployed forces in support of USEUCOM activities and operations. Under the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept, both types of forces are aligned into ten Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) for steady-state contingencies. Each AEF provides approximately the same capability, although the type of assets may differ.

The forces in each AEF are scheduled to fulfill CINC steady-state requirements for one 90-day period every 15 months. Thus, rotations of personnel and equipment occur on a predictable and stable basis. Outside of this 90-day window, the AEFs are in training and will be available to support CJCS exercises and CINC engagement activities.

Joint Task Forces

An integral part of USEUCOM's power projection capability is the Joint Task Force (JTF). USEUCOM has five JTFs based in theater and capable of rapid deployment. These JTFs are organized to support a specific mission requirement and include the Army's V Corps heavy combat force, which maintains the capability to deploy to any high-intensity combat situation worldwide. Similarly, the Army's Southern European Task Force light JTF is prepared to deploy on virtually no notice in response to crises. Additionally, Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), is capable of forming and commanding a JTF, or a Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF/JSOTF), to execute special operations throughout the USEUCOM AOR.

United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), maintains the capability to standup the 3rd Air Force (AF) and 16th AF both with trained JTF HQ. Recently, the 3rd AF provided the headquarters (HQ) and expertise for JTF SHINING HOPE.

Additionally, Commander, Sixth Fleet, maintains the capability to put a JTF HQ afloat ready to respond to crises across the spectrum of conflict.

Last year USEUCOM activated two JTFs: JTF NOBLE ANVIL, which helped us successfully counter Serbian aggression in Kosovo, and JTF SHINING HOPE, led by the 3rd AF in early April 1999 to help provide humanitarian relief to refugees fleeing Kosovo.

JTF SHINING HOPE built one refugee camp near Fier, Albania, called “Camp Hope,” capable of housing up to 20,000 refugees in 1,825 tents. The JTF was able to build Camp Hope in 51 days with initial capability for the first 2,500 refugees in just 12 days. The JTF coordinated transport and delivery of 1,334 tons of food and 2,111 tons of other materials, comprising 52 percent of the total materials supplied by the U.S. to support relief operations for the Kosovar refugees.

Clearly, these are all excellent demonstrations of our power projection capability and how the flexibility and responsiveness of global air mobility also figures prominently in the rapid, efficient deployment of essential expertise and cargo in support of such operations.

Assessing Readiness

Readiness is the precursor to successful execution of all our missions. Measuring readiness for future contingencies based solely upon the demonstrated success of our ongoing missions is a dangerous practice. As we observed in Operation NOBLE ANVIL, the sequencing of unit deployments may put units “in the chute” sooner than a major theater war (MTW) plan. Therefore, assessing readiness and force structure solely against the order of deployment to the MTWs has shortcomings.

There are no MTW contingencies currently projected for the USEUCOM AOR. By adding up the number of forces operationally committed in the USEUCOM AOR, you find that this theater is nearing the operational level of commitment that an MTW requires. The USEUCOM AOR currently has the approximate equivalent of two Army divisions deployed on commitments to ONW, KFOR, SFOR, and other activities and exercises.

Training

Our training programs are designed to ensure our troops are prepared for the full spectrum of military operations. Significant emphasis has been placed on ensuring that key war-fighting skills are maintained during extended contingency deployments. Training range modernization and updating are other important force enablers. Our servicemen need training areas that are modern and more adequately reflect the setting into which our Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines deploy.

Critical skill training is provided through the use of on-site combat system simulators that provide soldiers with virtual and realistic weapons system engagement opportunities throughout the deployment. USEUCOM conducts innovative training, maximizing available host nation resources such as ranges and training areas. When units return from contingencies, they undergo reintegration training designed to return them to full war-fighting capability.

An example of training is the Army’s Reserve Component (RC) troop construction program. Nearly 2,000 engineer soldiers participated this past year in eight different locations and rendered mission support to vital projects and requirements throughout the theater. Integrated and

coordinated activities provide units with training opportunities in planning, designing, and constructing engineering projects. Their efforts in both maintenance and expansion of major training areas have significantly increased the quality of training we are able to provide for U.S. and NATO forces. The positive readiness impact and mission support capability of this mutually beneficial program is a win-win situation for both the local installation commander and the engineer.

The ability to deploy troops quickly and set up forward-deployed units has been improved through the experience gained while supporting contingency operations. In addition, forward-deployed units, operating together for extended periods, build a level of teamwork and camaraderie not possible to develop during normal garrison activities. The discipline and unit cohesion gained during operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Operations Other Than War activities should not be underestimated.

Exercises. During FY'99, USEUCOM conducted 58 CJCS exercises of the 72 planned, with 14 being cancelled due to operations related to Kosovo. For FY'00, we expect to execute 55 exercises.

Theater and Air Missile Defense. During the last year we participated in six Theater and Air Missile Defense (TAMD) exercises. We also had a real world contingency that caused us to deploy TAMD forces to Turkey. There is a growing need for these types of defensive systems to meet future security threats against both the U.S. and our allies.

The U.S., Netherlands, Germany, and Israel all have PATRIOT forces. To achieve synergistic combined defensive capability, these Allied systems must be able to operate with our existing and future TAMD systems.

Israel remains justifiably concerned about the regional proliferation of WMD and Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), and is preparing to declare initial operational capability for its Arrow Weapon System.

From a policy perspective, we are developing three overarching governing directives for augmenting the TMD of Israel. One directive is a broadly based initiative covering general military support. A second directive deals with Shared Early Warning procedures. A third focuses on optimizing the effectiveness and efficiency of our Combined Air Defense Elements. All three initiatives will significantly enhance interoperability between our forces and will be tested in a robust, combined exercise program.

COMBINED ENDEAVOR. Headquarters USEUCOM sponsors a one-of-a-kind communications and information systems interoperability exercise called COMBINED ENDEAVOR. This unique exercise has become the test-bed for defining command, control, communication, and computer (C4) requirements as it charts the course toward an interoperable future with coalition partners. The number of participating nations has grown steadily since the inception of the exercise in 1995. Currently, 34 countries plus NATO are actively planning to participate in COMBINED ENDEAVOR 2000, including the Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations of Albania and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.

Extended Air Defense Task Force. The Extended Air Defense Task Force (EADTF) was activated in December 1999. It is a combined U.S., Dutch, and German unit which will strengthen our common security and increase the interoperability of our ground based Air Defense Forces. The EADTF is the first standing Combined Air Defense Task Force that provides us with a combined force of air defense experts to support possible NATO and Non-NATO contingency missions. It is scheduled to participate at various command and control echelons in five U.S. and NATO Training Exercises in FY'00.

ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Partnership for Peace

The most important first step toward NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was their active participation in the PfP program, an integral component of the European security architecture.

The Program has continued to meet its goals of deepening interaction with PfP partners, regardless of their intentions toward NATO membership; extending stability toward the East; providing a consultation mechanism for partners who feel threatened; assisting partners' pursuit of democratic reforms; and preparing partners for possible NATO membership.

The PfP program continues to pay big dividends for operations in Bosnia, with over 30 nations providing support and nearly one-third of the forces coming from non-NATO nations. The growth of the PfP program over the past six years has been dramatic and, in addition to real world operations, PfP exercises are providing superb training opportunities.

PfP military goals include deepening military relations, developing interoperable forces, command and control structures, and preparing partners for peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and peace support operations. PfP formalizes the relationship between NATO and nearly all the other nations of Europe.

Special Operations Forces

One tool for the effective implementation of our engagement programs are Special Operations Forces (SOF). These activities focus largely on their unique capability to organize and train indigenous forces in internal defense. By interacting with foreign military counterparts throughout the theater, SOF instill in host nation forces a sense of loyalty and professionalism that support democratic government and ideals. In the process, SOF gain valuable training and cultural experiences from these regional engagements.

In FY'99, Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) conducted 43 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) initiatives in 29 countries. Activities accomplished were far below those planned due to SOF involvement in Kosovo. For FY'00, SOCEUR has scheduled 102 JCETs in 47 countries. SOF have become USEUCOM's force of choice for engaging on the fringes of the theater in uncertain environments to open new doors and to shape the battlespace in preparation for possible contingency operations.

Joint Contact Team Program

Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) is one of the key elements of USEUCOM's peacetime engagement, helping to shape the security environment. This program brings American ideals and democratic values to countries in Central Europe and the New Independent States. The program now includes 17 countries.

Joint Military Liaison Teams, with three to five members in each team, serve to demonstrate to the host nation how our military functions under civilian control. There have been over 6,400

bilateral military-to-military (mil-to-mil) team exchange events. JCTP is an important part of our bilateral peacetime engagement. Its events pave the way for countries to participate in Security Assistance and PfP activities.

Reserve Components (RCs) also support JCTP at headquarters USEUCOM, and participate on all Military Liaison Teams, and execute about 24 percent of JCTP events. This highly successful program leverages limited manpower and fiscal resources and can only be accomplished with the continued support of the RCs.

State Partnership Program

American service members serving in the National Guard and reserves are particularly effective advocates for democratic ideals and civilian control of the military. They provide a tangible example of the American concept of the citizen-soldier as we guide these countries toward transparent, defense-oriented militaries. The activities of the State Partnership Program have resulted in lasting relationships with key elements of society in the former Iron Curtain countries.

In addition to mil-to-mil contact, this program fosters exchanges between civic and government leaders, business people, and academicians. Twenty-two states have partnerships with Eastern Countries. Although funding remains a significant hurdle, there is potential for this highly successful engagement program to expand to the African continent.

Arms Control

USEUCOM is on the leading edge of arms control, participating in seven distinct treaties and political agreements that promote Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in Europe.

At the cornerstone of security in Europe are the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Vienna Document on CSBM. Between these two instruments, firm equipment ceilings for conventional armaments, intrusive verification regimes, information exchanges, equipment destruction, and demonstrations of new weapon systems were established to promote transparency and prevent destabilizing miscalculations. Both instruments were updated in 1999 to retain their relevance in a post-Cold War Europe.

In order to effectively execute its arms control responsibilities, part of the USEUCOM staff serves as an integrated part of a multi-service, multi-agency, multi-national network of treaty experts.

Marshall Center

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies supports our engagement in many ways. The curriculum consists of post-graduate level studies that provide a current focus on how national security is formulated and maintained in democratic societies. Courses are taught in English, German, and Russian and may include participants from up to 40 countries. With the December 1999 graduation, the Marshall Center has graduated a total of 1,470 students. Perhaps most notably, representatives from all three ethnic groups representing the former warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina are attending classes at the Marshall Center together. Additionally, the

Marshall Center Conference Center organized 17 conferences for FY'99 on a variety of security-related topics designed to engage participants in constructive discussion.

The research program establishes and maintains Central, Eastern and Southern European, Russian, and Eurasian contacts and research networks; engages academia of the region; assists on the development of material that support course curricula and the conference program; and publishes scholarly articles and books.

The Marshall Center was named Interim Secretariat for the PfP Consortium and has been conducting annual conferences to coordinate the activities of the military academic institutions within this consortium. The most recent conference was held in December of 1999 in Sofia, Bulgaria.

African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a multi-lateral training initiative intended to work cooperatively with both African and non-African countries. The goal is to increase interoperability among African militaries in their support of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The initiative calls for the limited delivery of non-lethal equipment and U.S. trainers to conduct a program tailored to each participant country's needs.

The ACRI training program of instruction also shapes the African environment by promoting professional apolitical militaries, reinforcing respect for human rights and providing a strong example of the role of the military in a democracy. This U.N.-approved program of instruction combines U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations doctrine. Program instruction develops common standards for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations among the participating ACRI countries.

In 1999, members of the 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG) and USAREUR conducted battalion-level multilateral training with Belgian trainers in Ghana, and Senegal. The 3rd SFG also expanded upon the battalion initial training phase in Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Malawi, and Mali by conducting follow-on training events. Five follow-on training events conducted over a two-year period focused on multi-national staff development and high level training to ensure ACRI-trained units maintain proficiency and enhance their capability to conduct more advanced peacekeeping activities. There are several scheduled follow-on training events for Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin, and Malawi over the next year.

Our efforts over the next three years will be to complete the ACRI training program with already-participating nations and recruit new lead nations that bring logistics support capability to this initiative. Once these countries are trained, we will have achieved an end-state of 10 to 12 trained battalions -- approximately 1,200 peacekeepers. Additionally, two brigade staff headquarters will be trained, beginning with Senegal in the fall of 2000. With Ghana's pledge of a second battalion and a brigade headquarters, our goal is nearly complete.

The number of operations we conduct each year in Africa makes success of the ACRI particularly important. For example, during the past two years we deployed and were prepared to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) in Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Liberia.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies began operations with its inaugural Senior Leader Seminar in Dakar, Senegal, in early November 1999. I solicit your continued support in order to

fund the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Joint Staff review validating the need for an increase of 37 personnel in order to support this important initiative. USEUCOM is working closely with the OSD and other agencies to implement the Center's academic curriculum, which stresses civil-military relations, security strategy, and defense resource management.

The inaugural Senior Leader Seminar was very well received, with 115 participants from 45 African and six European countries. The Center's international faculty will offer one additional seminar this year in Gaborone, Botswana and three additional seminars during FY'01.

Demining

It is essential that we develop and deploy the capability to detect and clear mines in the surf zone, very shallow water, and on land. Mine-countermeasure systems, such as mine-clearing equipment for Landing Craft-Air Cushion (LCAC) operations, airborne-mine-countermeasure equipment and Standoff Mine Detection Systems (STAMIDs) for ground forces would provide an acceptable response to this requirement.

Mines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) continue to be a major danger in the Balkans. In Kosovo, combat engineers used the Panther, a robotic mine clearing vehicle, and Mini-Flails to clear mines from construction sites and roads used by our forces. It is extremely important we continue to develop more sophisticated means to detect and remove mines.

USEUCOM's Humanitarian Demining (HD) program continued to expand in FY'99, in spite of the reduction in Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding due to reprogramming dictated by Hurricane Mitch. We were able to rework our existing country plans and execute those critical missions necessary to maintain momentum in our developing programs. Simultaneously, we reduced the amount of assistance provided to mature programs to maximize the use of existing funds.

Through this expeditious approach, we were able to execute 22 of our 25 programmed missions to Bosnia, Chad, Mauritania, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. As funding later became available, we were able to add assessment visits to Azerbaijan, Moldova, Albania and Macedonia.

HD continues to be a tremendous engagement tool within the USEUCOM AOR. The USEUCOM HD program promotes regional stability and host nation self-sufficiency, helps open new doors to further U.S. interests through humanitarian means, assists in retooling former hostile militaries for peace, and demonstrates U.S. resolve in fulfilling President Clinton's 2010 Demining Initiative. Simultaneously, it provides our SOF and conventional forces an outstanding training opportunity where they can hone their training and language skills while gaining first hand knowledge of the host nation. Request funding continue at present levels to ensure future program success.

Security Assistance

One of our primary methods of carrying out our foreign and national security policy remains Security Assistance, a program that includes the transfer of defense articles, defense services, military training, and economic assistance. The program is made up of several components including Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET).

Foreign Military Financing. FMF enables nations to improve their defense capabilities by assisting in the acquisition of U.S. military goods, services and training. Romania, for example, used FMF in 1999 to fund the creation of Romania's first Non-commissioned Officers (NCO) Training Center. FMF paid for computers, equipment, study materials, accommodations, and the travel and training of the U.S. Marines from the Marine Corps Combat Development Center who trained the initial class. The first class of NCOs graduated in November 1999 and they in turn will train follow-on classes.

Another example can be found in North Africa. Both Morocco and Tunisia spend \$20-30 million annually for the sustainment of U.S.-origin equipment. FMF restoration in FY'99, although modest, was vital in offsetting their costs. These countries continue to be a source of stability and moderation in the turbulent Middle East/North Africa region and continuation of Security Assistance programs will positively influence regional stability in the future.

International Military Education and Training. IMET is an integral component of our military relations throughout the USEUCOM AOR. In many countries, particularly in Africa, IMET is the primary, and often the only military engagement tool available. Our IMET training efforts are focused primarily in three areas: professional development, the role of the military in a democratic society (under the Expanded IMET initiative, or E-IMET), and English language development.

IMET trained almost 1,400 international students in U.S. military schools during FY'99, and we are projecting over 1,700 students in FY'00. Of these, 577 officers attended professional schools, which include our most senior schools in the U.S., such as War Colleges and Command and Staff Colleges. We are currently projecting 731 officers will participate in these professional military education programs in FY'00.

Under the E-IMET initiative, more than 50 Mobile Education Teams (MET) traveled to 30 countries in USEUCOM during FY'99. These METs teach subjects such as military justice and human rights, civil military relations, health resources management and integration, defense resources management and budget planning, equal opportunity, maritime counter-drug law enforcement, and more.

These teams reached approximately 1,000 civilian and military leaders in these countries. During FY'00 we will build on the successes of FY'99 and plan 84 E-IMET METs to visit 36 countries to continue to emphasize these important subjects, or to delve deeper into areas of mutual interest to the U.S. and the host country.

The IMET program bought 13 English language teaching laboratories for 18 countries in FY'99 and plans to buy another 16 labs for 12 countries in FY'00. Additionally, the IMET program trained approximately 117 English teachers in 26 countries during FY'99. IMET plans include providing training for another 140 English teachers in 30 countries during FY'00.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

During FY'99, USEUCOM's HA activities were severely reduced due to the loss of OHDACA funds resulting from the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch. With remaining OHDACA and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) funding we carried out 13 of 59 approved HA projects and 19 of our 38 approved HA-Excess Property shipments.

USEUCOM facilitated stand-alone construction and renovation projects throughout Eastern Europe and Africa in 1999. Partnership with the U.N. enabled USEUCOM to make significant

strides in promoting regional disaster preparedness in Africa. HCA add-on funding purchased HA medical and construction consumables to support eight operations.

Maintaining the ability to store excess Department of Defense property in storage facilities in Germany remains a key factor in the overall success of the HA program. There have been several occasions where emergency issue of excess medical equipment and consumables quickly provided relief of pain and suffering due to armed conflict or natural disasters.

USEUCOM's HA programs remain a valuable component of the Theater Engagement Strategy and have the added benefit of providing unique training venues to reinforce military skills. In some nations these programs are the only engagement activities we may perform. The synchronizing of HA activities allows USEUCOM and American Embassies to establish meaningful relationships with key government and military officials, as well as project a positive image of the U.S. government and military by helping the citizens of developing nations.

Defense Attaché Program

The new National Security Strategy highlights the need for improvement to international force protection efforts in Africa. For over four years, HQ USEUCOM has highlighted the need to increase the number of Defense Attachés in Africa. Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service has provided excellent support, planning to open 10 new Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) in Africa before FY'02. Robust Defense Attaché presence in Africa permits economy of force operations and is a force protection imperative.

In the increasingly important Black Sea/Caucasus region, DAOs provide vital information on emerging crises and engagement opportunities. USEUCOM would appreciate any support you can provide for our Defense Attachés.

Military Liaison Office Program

Every theater component participates in intelligence engagement activities. One example is USAREUR's Military Liaison Office (MLO) program. This program has fewer than 35 personnel leveraging more than 35,000 personnel in 17 allied and intelligence-security agencies through bilateral intelligence exchanges, day-to-day force protection, combating terrorism, and counterintelligence liaison. Currently, the MLO program consists of only eight offices throughout Europe with a requirement for 12 total.

USAFE maintains liaisons with eight different countries. USNAVEUR, working in conjunction with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), also has active intelligence engagements with more than ten countries in the AOR. These partners make significant analytic or collection contributions, often providing unique access to otherwise unavailable information. Some partners provide data critical to maintaining a timely and comprehensive situational awareness of the maritime AOR. SOCEUR also runs a highly effective liaison program.

U.S. Coast Guard Support to USEUCOM

The value of U.S. Coast Guard activities in the USEUCOM AOR continues to grow. The Coast Guard plays an essential role in USEUCOM maritime engagement, conducting cutter

deployments, providing Mobile Training Teams, and supporting the JCTP and Security Assistance Program in 38 littoral countries within the USEUCOM AOR.

The Coast Guard provides unique expertise in fields such as maritime border security and law enforcement, search and rescue, port safety, and marine environmental protection. These are all areas of interest to numerous countries within the USEUCOM AOR. Coast Guard assets provide an invaluable, non-threatening means to improve relations with smaller navies and other maritime services in these countries. Cutter deployments bring a particularly useful capability to the USEUCOM AOR. Cutters provide an operational response capability for maritime interdiction operations. While I recognize the need for Coast Guard resources in the Western Hemisphere, much could be done to promote good relations and professionalize maritime services in the USEUCOM AOR with increased Coast Guard support to our Theater.

RESOURCE INVESTMENTS – PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE

“The judgment, creativity, and fortitude of our people will remain the key to success in future joint operations.”

Joint Vision 2010

USEUCOM provides input on resource priorities through appropriate DoD channels. I would like to take this opportunity to highlight some of the most important aspects of USEUCOM's resource requirements.

Force Protection

My highest priority for the USEUCOM Theater is Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP). We have implemented a number of innovative AT/FP initiatives, including developing a FP Campaign Plan, and publishing an AT/FP Operations Order (OPORD) that institutes mandatory prescriptive AT/FP standards and requirements. Our mandatory standards encompass FP design and construction engineering considerations for new construction and major renovations, as well as existing facilities, to include family housing.

This aggressive AT/FP program is not without fiscal impact. USAREUR has estimated increases of approximately 20 percent for housing renovations and 10 percent for barracks renovations to meet the newest standards that are to go into effect in 2002. This will have a significant impact on our buy-out programs for these areas.

We have developed and instituted a comprehensive Installation AT/FP Program Manager training course to teach our standards and requirements. To date, we have negotiated 51 CINC-Chief of Mission Memoranda of Agreement that delineate AT/FP responsibility for DoD elements and personnel located in the USEUCOM AOR.

Our theater-wide vulnerability assessment program is aggressive. We have conducted over 120 AT/FP vulnerability assessments. These assessments identify AT/FP vulnerabilities and assist commanders in addressing those deficiencies through the use of countermeasures, procedural changes, and funding -- endeavoring to eliminate or mitigate their potential exploitation by terrorists.

We have also developed a web-based Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (VAMP) to automate the prioritization and tracking of vulnerability assessment findings and resource

requirements. Our components have robust terrorism awareness training programs to ensure that all personnel receive required training and an annual refresher brief.

We incorporate AT/FP considerations and mission analysis into all deliberate, crisis, and contingency operational planning and exercises. Units deploying into or within our AOR conduct site surveys that assess potential risks to terrorist attacks. Our intelligence operations have increased their focus on detecting and assessing potential terrorist activity.

Quality Of Life

Our most precious resources, service members and their families, are our number-one combat multiplier. The well-being of USEUCOM families is one of my very top theater priorities, and is inextricably linked to readiness, retention, and reinforcement of Service core values, healthy family life, high morale, and mission accomplishment.

The quality of our housing, medical care, schools, religious services, public facilities, services, and recreation activities should reflect the American standard of living -- a privilege we have all pledged to defend. The expectation of the DoD family is to enjoy that standard of living for which they sacrifice so much in order to preserve for all Americans. Our continuing goal is to ensure all USEUCOM forces enjoy the optimum achievable standard of living.

Our most important 1999 Quality of Life (QOL) objective was to analyze and quantify the impact QOL has on readiness and retention. We took "expert testimony" from junior enlisted members and families across the Theater to get an "in the trenches" view. Their conclusions were identical to those of their enlisted seniors and commanding officers: QOL is critical to personnel readiness and retention. Perhaps even more so than their seniors, junior enlisted personnel are not satisfied with the quality of the programs in this AOR. Family housing and barracks, spouse employment, child care, health care and dependent education were consistently identified as lagging the farthest behind.

One way to remedy this shortcoming is to provide our young families serving in Europe the same kind of Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program that is available in the United States. This program should be adequately funded and, as in the United States, not include "housing in kind" as income. Additionally, to ensure that our families have the needed skills to cope with the environment in which they live, they need access to family advocacy treatment and prevention programs, including the New Parent Support Program.

We must also do better in compensating service members and families whose well being continues to be taxed through repetitive deployments and the stress of family separations.

DOD SUPPORT PROGRAMS

Current high Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) is cited as a significant factor affecting QOL for USEUCOM families. Overseas troops, civilian employees and families must often rely solely on DoD-provided support programs since off-base alternatives available to their CONUS counterparts do not exist overseas.

Dependent Education

With over half of USEUCOM service members supporting families with children in school, the quality of DoD's dependent education programs rank very high in determining QOL for our service members. The DoD education system is the 37th largest U.S. public school system, with 160 schools serving 78,000 students. USEUCOM provides logistical support for 111 of these schools and 46,368 students. We should not lose programmed funding for all-day kindergarten. Improved student-to-teacher ratios are also extremely important. Program based staffing is critical to provide a full range of educational opportunity for all of our DoD schools. Athletics, music, art, and associated after school activities are as critical as the core academic subjects of math, science, history, and English. We must take aggressive action to expand vocational, technical and school-to-work opportunities for our students.

Additionally, linking Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) programs to the National Education Goals and Presidential Initiatives are essential to ensuring that overseas education programs do not lag behind their Continental United States (CONUS) counterparts. We must work toward establishing an 18:1 student-teacher ratio for grades kindergarten and 4-12. I would also like to see installation school boards that would allow parents and community leaders to participate in the decision-making process for dependent education.

Health Care

We also have a responsibility to provide a world-class health and dental plan, with uniformity of medical and dental benefits and standardized processes for beneficiaries as they move throughout the world.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Every extra bit of funding helps, including the \$50 million funding received via FY'99 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation for Morale, Welfare and Recreation, and Personnel Support for contingency deployments. This funding was greatly appreciated and will improve the QOL for all those deployed. Continued improvement to QOL issues in FY'01, will, in the long run, serve to improve manning concerns.

Housing

Last year Congress supported all of our FY'00 Military Construction and Family Housing projects. I am grateful for your support, as are the troops and their families who benefit from these projects. However, the challenge of eliminating and renovating large numbers of inadequate housing units is still an enormous obstacle we continue to attack on a daily basis. Those of you who have visited our Theater know that nearly 80 percent of USAREUR's and 72 percent of USAFE's family housing units fall far short of the DoD standards. Forty-eight percent of USAREUR's barracks do not meet DoD standards. Two-thirds of those were constructed by the German Army in the 1930's and still have gang latrines. These barracks receive only minor improvements and necessary maintenance and repair.

Our Service Components have used a "worst first" strategy to upgrade our housing and furniture inventory. Current DoD guidance requires elimination of gang latrines by 2008 and elimination of inadequate housing by 2010. All USEUCOM's Components, with the exception of

USAFE, are on track to meet these goals. Current projected funding streams will not fix USAFE's family housing until 2014. I ask that Congress remain committed to fixing all housing in this Theater.

Infrastructure

Combat Support. We currently project our combat power into Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southwest Asia in support of U.S. Central Command. These commitments make the continued degradation of our combat-support infrastructure untenable.

Insufficient Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Real Property Maintenance (RPM) allocations aggravate our already excessive facility maintenance backlog. Our facilities are far below minimum standards with high-cost equipment parked in unpaved motor parks and maintained in old horse stables, or worse yet, out in the open and subject to the harsh winter weather.

We use all available funding sources including the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), RV, PIK, and additional funding from Congress. However, continued shortfalls in infrastructure maintenance impact our readiness.

USAREUR will have a FY'01 RPM shortfall of over \$350 million. USNAVEUR's and USAFE's shortfalls are considerably less (\$17.9 million and \$22.1 million respectively), but every dollar budgeted is necessary. The shortfalls in RPM have been exacerbated over the years as local commanders have been forced to use their limited discretionary money from RPM to pay under-funded must-pay Other Base Operating Support (OBOS) costs, such as fire protection, utility and trash removal, contractor and civilian pay. The OBOS shortfalls are as critical as RPM, and they also exist throughout the Theater. USNAVEUR's FY'01 OBOS shortfall is \$66 million, and USAFE's FY'01 OBOS shortfall is \$7.4 million. Coupled with the already mentioned RPM shortfall, deficits force local commanders into an "emergency repair only" mode, which impacts on mission accomplishment.

Embarkation Facilities. USEUCOM has been working to gain NATO support for funding deployment embarkation facilities to enhance our deployment capabilities, especially from the Central Region of Europe. Deployment hubs are central to this initiative. Although the Deployment Processing Center at Kaiserslautern's Rhine Ordnance Barracks, together with Ramstein Air Base, constitutes a key deployment hub, we must continue to evaluate the possibility of operating out of multiple locations in support of future contingencies.

NATO Security Investment Program. NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) is a cost-sharing program for acquisition of common-use systems and equipment to which all NATO allies contribute. It includes construction, upgrade and restoration of military facilities, programs, and projects required in support of NATO's strategic concept, as well as new missions such as crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance.

NSIP provides NATO funding for infrastructure projects. U.S. contributions make up about 25 percent of the total project cost. In exchange, we gain access to the resulting infrastructure and facilities through NATO.

We have been successful in getting NSIP projects funded for U.S. installations, most notably Aviano Air Base, Italy; Spangdahlem and Ramstein Air Bases in Germany; Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia; and Royal Air Force Bases at Lakenheath and Mildenhall, Great Britain. In addition, NSIP funded U.S. command, control, and communications support to SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, and other vital projects in support of deployed forces in the Balkans. NSIP provides infrastructure improvements for our troops, while demonstrating a cost-effective commitment to NATO.

Residual Value. We are working aggressively to realize maximum payment for prior U.S. investment at installations turned back to our NATO allies through the Residual Value (RV) process. The amount we receive from RV is reinvested in our existing infrastructure, either to revitalize old facilities or to replace a lost capability when a facility is returned to the host nation. The amount we receive has fallen short of our investment because proceeds are based on current market conditions. We have found some of our facilities, such as air defense and ground-launched-missile sites, have little or no market value today to the host nation. Cash settlements and RV recoupments have been invested in our core installations. In Germany, the Payment in Kind (PIK) program provides compensatory construction in advance of anticipated settlements for returned facilities. Because we have already settled most of our returns resulting from the major drawdown in European forces, projections for future PIK returns are limited. To date we have received over \$320 million in PIK funds and estimate an additional \$60 million through FY'03, but market prices fluctuate daily.

Environmental Compliance. The USAREUR Environmental Protection Program is under-funded by \$133 million between FY'00 to FY'06. This seriously affects USAREUR's ability to honor obligations to its host nations under Status of Forces Agreements and potentially undermines the claim that we are good stewards of the environment. Funding this program will allow USAREUR to comply with host nation statutes and ensure it retains access to host nation real property required to sustain readiness and quality of life.

Reserve Components (RCs)

Forces of the RCs have been extremely productive and beneficial to USEUCOM. Our goal is to enhance integration and employment of RC forces in all our operations, both peacetime and contingency.

Examples of the success of this effort include the daily contributions of the U.S. Army Reserve's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations organizations. The contributions of these units are essential to continued stability and progress in Bosnia, Kosovo, and throughout the AOR. These critical, low density/high demand assets provide a unique capability that bridges the gap between military and civilian organizations to help ensure the smooth and successful implementation of USEUCOM theater objectives.

Over recent years the reserve forces contribution to USEUCOM's mission has become a critical enabler and force multiplier for success in contingency operations and engagement programs. During FY'99, RCs provided over 1.1 million man-days to USEUCOM missions helping to offset the strain on forward deployed and rotationally deployed units. We must maintain adequate force levels of our RCs in order to continue the outstanding support provided by our military "citizen soldiers."

Continued funding authorizations to the reserve components to leverage reserve strengths overseas helps offset the significant OPTEMPO within the theater. An example is the plan for the Army's active component to rotate command and control responsibilities for Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Army National Guard (ARNG). The first rotation of an ARNG headquarters will occur this spring when the 49th Armored Division (TXARNG) assumes command and control of the U.S. SFOR.

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve combat, airlift, and tanker aircraft are fully integrated into daily operations for OJF and ONW. Air Reserve Component (ARC) KC-135

aircraft performed tanker operations out of Aviano, Italy, and Istres, France, among other locations. ARC C-130s conduct U.S. intra-theater airlift missions in the Balkans, allowing active-duty aircrews to maintain currency in other wartime skills.

Over 70 percent of Air Force Combat Communications and Engineering and Installation force structure is in the Air National Guard. The ARC, equipped with modern and interoperable combat and support systems, enable USAFE-based air forces to maintain a higher condition of readiness to conduct operations in support of USEUCOM, NATO and national security objectives.

Naval Reserves filled over 90 percent of Navy billets in support of Operations DELIBERATE FORGE, JOINT FORGE, JOINT GUARDIAN, and ONW. They provided 100 percent of Navy fixed-wing medium logistic airlift in the AOR. Naval Reservists are an integral piece in the day-to-day operations of the Theater, providing support ranging from Fleet operations to Theater Force protection.

Additionally, U.S. Naval Reserve Special Mission (VQ) aircraft supported combat operations during Operation ALLIED FORCE and flew support missions for ONW. Naval Reserve personnel embarked in USS INCHON (MCS-12) provided direct support to humanitarian operations in Albania during Operation SAFE HARBOR. Likewise, the Naval Reserve activated several Naval Construction Force Seabees to help build the semi-permanent installations at Camp Montieth, Gnjilane, Kosovo.

RCs also provide significant contributions to USEUCOM's intelligence capabilities. In FY'99, reserve forces contributed approximately 281 man-years of intelligence effort in support of this Theater. RC production support by the Joint Analysis Center's (JAC) CONUS-based partners (Fort Gillem, GA, Fort Sheridan, IL, and Birmingham, AL), the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC), Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Elements (JRISE), and Cryptologic Reserve Operations Support Elements (CROSE), continue to augment our intelligence capabilities.

In FY'99, the contributions of these sites covered approximately 40 percent of the JAC's scheduled DoD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) yearly intelligence production. The JAC would not be able to maintain its high quality intelligence support to operational forces without reserve contributions. USEUCOM is working closely with the Service RCs and the NSA to develop a plan to use RC cryptologic personnel in support of USEUCOM's collection and processing requirements. By taking advantage of a virtual teaming environment, USEUCOM accessed cryptologic reservists at JRICs, augmenting work performed by in-theater personnel.

Strategic Mobility

Strategic mobility is crucial across the spectrum of conflict. In terms of airlift and sealift, we are the only nation in the world with the mobility assets to respond where and when needed. A recent example is Military Sealift Command's move of more than 1.15 million square feet of cargo, or 267,000 tons of supplies and equipment to support our Kosovo operation. This effort constitutes over 75 percent of the cargo moved during the entire operation.

Even with our forward-stationed forces, most contingencies continue to require significant strategic airlift and strategic-mobility augmentation from CONUS. While improvements in airframes and ship hulls are being addressed, we have not yet done enough to remedy strategic airlift and en route infrastructure node shortfalls within the USEUCOM AOR.

In our mission to support regional stability within this AOR, it is essential that we champion full funding for C-17 aircraft with required modifications and logistics sustainment, as well as specified C-5 aircraft modifications.

Though transportation mediums are important for getting our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to the fight, strategic infrastructure is also important. Construction and improvement of railways, airfields and piers greatly enhance the deployment operations of every Service component.

One way Congress recognized this need was the decision to fund Phase II of the fuel-dispensing hydrant system at Moron Air Base, Spain, out of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill. Additionally, expanding Rota Naval Station, Spain, remains a critical requirement. Upgrading the fuel-dispensing hydrant system at Moron Air Base and expanding Rota Naval Station are critical to sustaining U.S. and NATO support to theater and out-of-theater forces. Contingency Mobility. Providing a continuous presence of maritime assets for long-range, medium-range, air deliverable short-range, and submerged short-range mobility to its Special Operations Forces (SOF) for contingency and crisis response will significantly enhance SOF capabilities throughout the Theater.

Additionally, USEUCOM requires a rapidly deployable, aerial refuelable, medium-lift rotary-wing aircraft to meet immediate requirements for Theater SOF contingency response to distant areas of the AOR. A more timely response must be provided to support long-range theater contingencies that will minimize strategic lift requirements, and provide adequate lift in the low-threat, high incident environments.

RESOURCE INVESTMENTS – MODERNIZATION

Providing high-quality weapons and equipment for our forces is the responsibility of the individual Service components. My role as USCINCEUR is to make crucial input to the acquisition and requirements process through the Integrated Priority List (IPL), the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS), and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As a command that integrates the equipment and capabilities of all U.S. military Services, as well as the armed forces of other nations, we help ensure the procurement of cost-effective systems providing the greatest balance, capability, and interoperability for joint and combined operations with allies and coalition partners.

Following are several USEUCOM issues I would hope Congress would pay particular attention to during this year's authorization and appropriations process.

Medium Extended Air Defense System

The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) effort focuses on the development of maneuver force protection, with the objective of maintaining an international cooperative program with Germany and Italy. OSD recently identified a funding profile for MEADS through initial operational capability. These resources will be applied to initial development of the MEADS fire control radar, a mobile launcher, and support for integration. Multinational cooperative programs, such as MEADS, support coalition building in both peace and war, and build faith in U.S. commitment to cooperative armaments programs among our partner nations.

Amphibious Operations

A new Amphibious Assault Vehicle is required to provide the increased water speed (25 knots) necessary to execute over-the-horizon ship-to-objective movement and support operational maneuver from the sea objectives. This vehicle should have land speeds compatible with the M1A1 tank (45MPH) and requires improved armor/nuclear, biological, chemical protection and the capability to defeat light-armored threats.

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations

USEUCOM currently sponsors six Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), with two completed this past fiscal year. We anticipate sponsorship on three additional ACTDs in the near future and the completion of four programs during FY'00. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, several elements of the Counterproliferation-I ACTD managed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) contributed to our warfighting effort. It provided enhanced counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities including the advanced unitary penetrator (AUP), hard target smart fuse (HTSF), and integrated munitions effects assessment (IMEA) tools.

In one instance, collateral damage assessments through IMEA and DTRA analysis helped us avoid the potential deaths of 2500+ Serbian civilians. Additionally, advanced hardened target penetrating capability from the AUP and HTSF was requested by COMSIXTHFLEET and available, though not used in the operation.

Participation in these technology-based ACTD programs affords us the unique opportunity to influence the rapid fielding of capabilities to meet critical theater requirements.

Precision Strike: Low Cost, High Capabilities

Strike operations in Kosovo clearly demonstrated the utility of all-weather/all-target capable Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). USEUCOM requires precision strike munitions to engage a wide variety of targets, with an emphasis on targets in urban areas, and all-weather conditions. Ensuring an adequate inventory of these weapons will keep both collateral damage and cost down. Additional tactical aircraft PGMs, Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs), Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs), Navy Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM), and Army Tactical Missile Systems-Block 1A are a top priority due to their increased capabilities, and reduced cost and logistics consolidation necessary for their employment. I am pleased the FY99 Kosovo supplemental provided \$700 million not only to replenish munitions expended in Kosovo, but to procure and accelerate additional critical munitions. The U.S. Navy in particular has an inadequate inventory of "Ready for Issue" TLAMs. Funding for the tactical TLAM missile and for modifying TLAMs already in the inventory will help alleviate this shortfall.

Additionally, lessons learned from the Kosovo campaign dramatically illustrate the importance of the EA-6B Prowler platform in joint operations. The EA-6B is a critical enabler to all strike missions, yet there is still no replacement platform for this high value electronic warfare asset. Until a replacement is identified, it is critical to continue operational upgrades to this platform.

Procurement of these weapon systems in numbers sufficient to conduct sustained warfighting operations, in conjunction with investment in the required fine-grain intelligence and geospatial information, is critical to support my warfighting objectives in the USEUCOM AOR.

Theater Combat Search and Rescue Forces

USEUCOM requires a theater-based, dedicated Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capability to support frequent theater contingencies. While USAFE is designated as USCINCEUR's executive agent for all personnel-recovery operations in the USEUCOM AOR, it currently lacks organic assets to conduct CSAR operations. As a result, theater SOF are over-extended in this theater, and are now routinely tasked to support CSAR at the expense of core SOF mission readiness and capabilities.

Information Superiority

Information Superiority is the foundation upon which all other tenets of Joint Vision 2010 rest. We must have information superiority in both offensive and defensive Information Operations (IO), including the capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

Serbia made a concerted effort to conduct a coordinated Information Warfare campaign against NATO during the Kosovo Crisis. Saddam Hussein is using propaganda in an attempt to undermine coalition resolve against Iraq. Whether we respond or not, we are engaged in Information Operations against these two nations at this very moment. Our performance during Operation ALLIED FORCE resulted in a clear NATO victory over Serbian forces; however, there is significant room for improvement in this area. From an offensive standpoint, here is a Theater warfighter's view of where we should go in the wake of the Kosovo crisis:

- We must first enhance intelligence community (IC) support to IO. Intelligence constitutes the foundation for successful conduct of both offensive and defensive IO. Establishing national and CINC priorities for intelligence support to IO will better focus IC resources on characterizing vulnerabilities of adversaries' information environments, as well as adversaries' capabilities to affect U.S. and friendly information environments.
- There is a need to develop Computer Network Attack (CNA) capabilities to attack and exploit adversary computer networks. Some of the obstacles with employing CNA are rooted in policy, legal, and process issues, but the relationship between the kinds of techniques being developed must be constantly assessed.

As a result of technological advances, theater-information systems are under a continuously changing threat and must be protected. In conjunction with other agencies, USEUCOM is developing a defensive infrastructure to protect our information systems.

ISR Force Structure Shortfalls

Some observers of technology and intelligence issues believe that technology has enabled skilled personnel to be replaced with computers. Recent experiences in Operation ALLIED

FORCE indicated this is not true. Highly skilled individuals serving as critical links in the sensor-to-decision-maker-to-shooter chain must execute each and every intelligence procedure. USEUCOM has repeatedly testified and transmitted the Theater's Number One ISR concern -- that there are not enough skilled people out there to analyze the data collected.

Specifically, USEUCOM's most fundamental ISR issue is recruiting, retaining, and deploying a sufficient number of properly trained personnel to serve as imagery analysts, targeting specialists, linguists, counterintelligence specialists, all-source analysts, and collection managers. Demand for experienced non-commissioned and commissioned officers is at critical levels throughout the ISR force structure.

Enhanced Airborne Reconnaissance

ALLIED FORCE demonstrated the need to upgrade and modernize our low-density, high-demand ISR airborne assets. There are inadequate numbers of RC-135, EP-3E and Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) platforms and aircrews to adequately address intelligence and warfighting requirements. I support modernization of the U-2 fleet, with additional increases in pilots and manning at the exploitation sites for the data collected.

Open-ended military commitments, precision targeting, and force protection imperatives have greatly increased demand for precise information. Airborne Reconnaissance platforms provide the Theater and Joint Task Force commanders with responsive, Theater-based, flexible capability to satisfy critical intelligence needs. National systems simply do not have this level of responsiveness to the Theater, because they must prioritize the needs of all theater commands, and weigh them against the equally important demands of national decision-makers and the acquisition community.

The Department of Defense (DoD) must evaluate whether the two Major Theater War construct is adequate to address force structure requirements for low-density high-demand ISR assets.

USEUCOM Cryptologic Center

Bad Aibling Station (BAS), Germany, remains USEUCOM's primary focal point for providing direct, time-sensitive support to SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans. Resolving the future of BAS remains USEUCOM's number one architecture concern. This facility provides valuable and unique information for force protection, indications and warning, and target development for U.S. forces deployed in the Balkans. It is absolutely imperative that BAS remain open until NSA provides an alternative Theater Center to replace these capabilities. The continued operating cost of BAS is insignificant when weighed against the continued protection of U.S. forces deployed in the Balkans.

In addition to Theater-based support, NSA provides vital strategic warning and plays a key role in sustaining our warfighting and peacekeeping capabilities throughout the USEUCOM AOR. USEUCOM strongly supports modernizing NSA's technical infrastructure.

Joint Analysis Center

This command would also like to highlight the important work performed by the JAC at RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom. While this theater intelligence node performed superbly during the previous year, the Kosovo crisis did reveal some shortcomings.

As NATO has no dedicated intelligence center, the JAC became the designated intelligence center for the Alliance by default. Intelligence requirements during the crisis made it necessary for the JAC to reduce its coverage of areas outside the Balkans. For example, it was necessary to request USSTRATCOM assistance to continue intelligence support to our combat air patrols over Northern Iraq. Inadequate ISR manpower forces the JAC to compromise support for operationally engaged forces, and inhibits the Theater's ability to predict events in other parts of the AOR or help prevent crises through operations short of conflict. This station demonstrated its importance to the Alliance, and I request your support for improvements to its capabilities.

Communications Infrastructure Upgrades

We request your support for upgrading the aging communications infrastructure in the USEUCOM AOR. While communications systems like the Digital European Backbone (DEB) are being upgraded, a companion effort is needed at the base, post, camp, and station level. The present infrastructure, designed and built for voice communications, must be upgraded to take advantage of planned digital communications systems that are near ready for fielding. This infrastructure includes local area networks, fiber-optic cabling, network monitoring tools, software, maintenance and leased services.

Radio Frequency Spectrum

Use of the frequency spectrum remains vital to the conduct of military operations. More combat and support systems are dependent on access to the frequency spectrum than ever before.

Increasing competition with commercial and scientific users has made this a contentious issue. Within the USEUCOM AOR, we expect efforts to charge for military use of the spectrum will intensify. There has been progress on protecting DoD spectrum and countering spectrum reallocation with the FY'00 Defense Authorization Act. However, a new NATO policy on spectrum pricing which discourages charging other members for spectrum use must still be approved by the North Atlantic Council. While approval of this policy will be a positive first step, we must remain steadfast in our refusal to pay for military use of the frequency spectrum. A coordinated national and military spectrum strategy will help strengthen our arguments on this issue in Europe.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

USEUCOM is encouraged by reinvigorated Service efforts to develop UAVs. The Air Force's GLOBAL HAWK, Army's SHADOW, and Navy's VTOL UAV promise to provide increased capability within the U.S. family of UAV systems.

This Theater has demonstrated the requirement that UAVs be capable of operating up to 200 nautical miles away from friendly forces. A 200-mile radius of operation would allow UAVs to reach approximately 75 percent of the capital cities in African countries from offshore bases, allowing support to contingency operations on the African continent.

UAVs should have the capability to carry a variety of sensor payloads including electro-optical, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), electronic warfare, battle-damage assessment, foliage

penetration, laser target designators and chemical, biological, and nuclear detectors. They should also have encrypted digital-data-links with ground or ship-based processing sites to allow near real-time processing of data. UAVs should be deployable, low-cost, attributable, and all-weather capable. UAVs with increased dwell times at lower altitudes are more responsive to the tactical commander. The platform should have a small deployment footprint and be able to operate from austere locations.

Imagery sensors must be improved, or operating altitudes lowered to increase the resolution and value of collected imagery. Especially important in the development of new UAV systems is the provision of a dedicated Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED) architecture to support each combat deployment, or the successful integration into an effective, community-wide TPED battle management system. Otherwise, the addition of new sensor platforms will merely over-saturate an already saturated Theater and CONUS TPED infrastructure.

USEUCOM requires a TPED architecture that is a “system of systems” which are integrated and interoperable covering the end-to-end process for all ISR assets. The requirement for an Automated All-Source Intelligence Fusion Capability stems from the lack of one system that can fuse multi-source data in a useable format required to support and sustain combat operations. Existing shortfalls include: limited satellite access/communications bandwidth, stove pipe workstations and/or exploitation ground stations, lack of automated fusion tools and computer systems, as well as the lack of interoperability with coalition partners. Information intensive operations and new generation of collectors require TPED modernization and upgrade. The imbalance between collection capability and TPED increases the risk that data valuable to the warfighter not exploited, evaluated, or disseminated will “fall on the floor” and thus risk an intelligence failure.

Finally, effective Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) must be developed to ensure the administrative organizations responsible for operating and maintaining the UAVs, as well as those performing TPED functions are responsive and accountable to warfighting commanders in the field during contingency operations. Development of TTP must include the structure of command relationships, system architecture, and reporting process.

CONCLUSION

USEUCOM is a vital theater and a theater in transition. Although the threat of aggression from the East has receded, sustained theater-level military campaigns to keep the peace continue. These include: implementing the Dayton Agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contingency planning and force deployments to help resolve the ongoing situation in Kosovo in support of United Nations Resolution 1244, continuing tensions in the Middle East, and almost daily air-combat missions in support of Operation Northern Watch.

USEUCOM faces many other challenges, such as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), dealing with terrorism, shaping the post-Cold War security environment, and conducting contingency operations across a widely dispersed geographic area. Successfully meeting these challenges continues to require a strategy of engagement while maintaining our readiness to meet unforeseen crises.

USEUCOM’s AOR covers 89 countries, over 13 million square miles, and is home for more than one billion people. Our forward-deployed Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines shape the environment, prepare to defeat adversaries, and when necessary, respond to protect U.S.

interests. Combat and peace support operations in support of NATO in Kosovo have stressed our force structure and supporting infrastructure. Continued strong funding support for all our requirements is necessary for us to refit, replenish, and continue to execute our engagement and readiness activities in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the USEUCOM Strategy of Readiness and Engagement. An engaged, forward-deployed and forward-based force can continue to make significant progress in achieving U.S. national interests.

I would ask for your continued support of military construction, real property maintenance, and family housing requirements. The phrase “Quality of Life” should be more than a catch phrase. Quality of Life should reflect the value our Nation places in these men and women, who give so much back to the country they serve.

Appreciate the opportunity to address this committee. On behalf of your military men and women stationed in Europe, I am extremely grateful for the support you have provided USEUCOM during this past year.